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The Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) entanglement, originally introduced to uncover the ex-
treme violation of local realism against quantum mechanics, is an important resource for multiparty
quantum communication tasks. But the low intensity and fragility of the GHZ entanglement source
in current conditions have made the practical applications of these multiparty tasks an experimen-
tal challenge. Here we propose a feasible scheme for practically distributing the post-selected GHZ
entanglement over a distance of more than 100 km for experimentally accessible parameter regimes.
Combining the decoy-state and measurement-device-independent protocols for quantum key dis-
tribution, we anticipate that our proposal suggests an important avenue for practical multiparty
quantum communication.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac, 03.65.Ud
Remote distribution of quantum signals (photonic
states) is an essential task in the realm of quantum com-
munication. Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the
information-theoretically secure transmission of classical
messages and requires delivery of either single photons
in the case of BB84 protocol [1], or entangled photons in
the case of Ekert91 protocol [2]. Remote distribution of
entanglement also enables certain classically impossible
tasks, such as quantum teleportation of unknown states
and quantum dense coding [3]. Up to now, tremendous
efforts have been dedicated to increase the transmission
distance of quantum communication between two legit-
imate users. The recorded distance for QKD has been
more than 300 km for standard telecom fiber links [4],
while quantum teleportation has been demonstrated over
a distance of more than 100 km for free-space channels
[5].
So far, most theoretical and experimental works on
quantum communication are focused on two-party pro-
tocols. Yet, multiparty quantum communication proto-
cols do exist, as illustrated by the fascinating examples
like quantum cryptographic conferencing (QCC) [4, 5],
quantum secret sharing (QSS) [6, 9–11] and third-man
quantum cryptography [12]. These multiparty protocols
require an important resource–the Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) entangled states [13, 33] with perfect
multiparty quantum correlations, which are originally in-
troduced to reveal the extreme violation of local realism
against quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, the practical
applications of GHZ states are quite limited due to the
lack of two important factors–the high-intensity source
and remote reliable distribution of the GHZ states. The
existing experimental works [10] on multiparty quantum
communication remain the proof-of-principle demonstra-
tion and reported rather low key rates. The experimental
distribution of the GHZ entanglement [15] was achieved
only recently, over a distance of less than 1 km for each
party of the GHZ-entangled photons. Thus, the cur-
rent status of multiparty quantum communication still
remains an extreme experimental challenge even under
the state-of-the-art technologies and is far from practi-
cal applications. In this Letter, we propose a feasible
scheme for distributing the post-selected GHZ entangle-
ment over a distance of more than 100 km for experimen-
tally relevant parameter regimes. Combining the decoy-
state QKD [16] and the measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD [17] technologies, our findings manifest the
possibility for practical applications of MDI multiparty
quantum communication such as QCC and QSS, as well
as for the long-distance GHZ experiment.
Multiparty quantum communication protocols aim to
provide information-theoretic security for highly sensi-
tive and confidential multiuser communication based on
the laws of quantum mechanics, which physically out-
perform their classical counterparts. Their applications
[6, 9, 11] range from the secret multiparty conference,
remote voting, online auctioning, master key of the pay-
ment system, jointly checking accounts containing quan-
tum money [18], to secure distributed quantum computa-
tion [19]. Among them, QCC is a protocol for multiparty
QKD [5], which requires a common random bit sequence
(the keys) to be securely shared among the legitimate
users even in the presence of any eavesdropper. QSS is a
protocol of splitting a message into several parts amongst
a group of participants, each of whom is allocated a share
of the secret [6]. As a consequence, only the entire set is
sufficient to read the message thoroughly. For example,
QSS can be used to guarantee that no single person can
launch a nuclear missile, or open a bank vault, but all
legitimate users together can.
2FIG. 1. (color online) Schematic layout of the MDI-QCC setup. AM: amplitude modulator used to prepare decoy states; 3PBS:
3-port polarization-maintaining PBS, which, besides the function of PBS, can transit optical pulses from fast axis to slow axis;
Circ: circulator; PM: phase modulator, combining with 3PBS and Circ, is used to encode qubits; PC: polarization controller
which makes a unitary transformation like a half-wave plate such that it corresponds to a 45◦ rotation of the polarization; Black
Box: the GHZ-state measurement device; Att: attenuator used to prepare weak coherent pulses; EPC: electric polarization
controller used to adjust the frame of reference; PBS: polarizing beam-splitter which transmits |H〉 and reflects|V 〉 polarizations;
D1H, D2V, D2H D2V, D3H and D3V: single-photon detectors.
Before we describe our multiparty communication
schemes in detail, let us recapitulate the significance of
the GHZ state
∣∣Φ±0 〉 = 1/√2(|HHH〉 ± |V V V 〉), where
|H〉 and |V 〉 represent photonic horizontal and vertical
polarizations, respectively. If three members of a GHZ
state are measured along Z basis, each of them will give
a random outcome, ZA, ZB, ZC , and the outcomes of
the three members will always be in perfect correlations,
ZA = ZB = ZC , which can be used for multiparty
quantum cryptographic conferencing. Likewise, when
three members of a GHZ state
∣∣Φ+0 〉 (∣∣Φ−0 〉) are mea-
sured along X basis, each will give a random outcome
i.e., XA, XB, XC , whose sharing of a binary correlation
XA = XB ⊕XC (XA ⊕ 1 = XB ⊕XC) will always hold
and can then be used for multiparty QSS. Besides, when
Alice announces her measurement result XA, Bob and
Charlie will have a perfect correlation which can be used
for third-man quantum cryptography.
Here we exploit an approach that requires neither
the preparation in advance nor the distribution of
high-fidelity GHZ entangled states through a long dis-
tance. The design is to take advantage of post-selected
GHZ states among three legitimate users (typically
called Alice, Bob and Charlie) to perform information-
theoretically secure multiparty quantum communication.
Like the MDI-QKD protocol [17], the post-selecting mea-
surement device here can be regarded as a black box
which can be manipulated by anyone, even the eavesdrop-
per. Therefore, our scheme is naturally immune to all
detection-side attacks and can be regarded as the combi-
nation of time-reversed GHZ state distribution and mea-
surement. Together with the decoy-state method [16],
in which pulses with different amplitudes are randomly
mixed and phases are randomized, our scheme is able to
defeat photon-number-splitting attacks [20]. We utilize
conventional laser sources to obtain a long distribution
distance between the middle node and users for both the
MDI-QCC and MDI-QSS protocols. Similarly to the se-
curity proof of QKD [17, 21], we use multiparty entangle-
ment purification technique [22] to provide information-
theoretically secure information transmission. The se-
curity of our protocols is analyzed in the Supplemental
Material [23].
In the following, let us explain our MDI-QCC and
MDI-QSS protocols in more details. The main quantum
procedures of the two schemes are the same, while the dif-
ference lies in their classical post-processing. The MDI-
QCC (MDI-QSS) protocol uses the data in Z (X) basis to
extract secure keys. Our setup is depicted in Fig. 1. Here,
we take MDI-QCC protocol as an example. Alice, Bob
and Charlie independently and randomly prepare quan-
tum states with phase-randomized weak coherent pulses
in two complementary bases (Z basis and X basis). They
send the pulses to the untrusted fourth-party located in
the middle node, David, to perform a GHZ-state mea-
surement which projects the incoming signals onto a GHZ
state. Such a measurement can be realized, for instance,
using only linear optical elements [12]. Actually, this pro-
cedure only identifies two of the eight GHZ states, while
the identification of any one GHZ state is enough to prove
the security. A successful GHZ-state measurement cor-
responds to the observation of three out of six detectors
being clicked simultaneously. The clicks in D1H, D2H
and D3H, or in D1H, D2V and D3V, or in D1V, D2H
and D3V, or in D1V, D2V and D3H, imply a projection
onto the GHZ state
∣∣Φ+0 〉 = 1/√2(|HHH〉 + |V V V 〉),
3while the clicks in D1H, D2H and D3V, or in D1H,
D2V and D3H, or in D1V, D2H and D3H, or in D1V,
D2V and D3V, indicate a projection onto the GHZ state∣∣Φ−0 〉 = 1/√2(|HHH〉 − |V V V 〉). David announces the
events through public channels whether he has obtained
a GHZ state and which GHZ state he has received. Al-
ice, Bob and Charlie only keep the raw data of success-
ful GHZ-state measurements and discard the rest. They
post-select the events where they use the same basis in
their transmission through an authenticated public chan-
nel. Notice that Alice performs a bit flip when Alice, Bob
and Charlie all choose X basis and David obtains a GHZ
state
∣∣Φ−0 〉. We employ the data of Z basis to gener-
ate the cryptographic conferencing keys, while the data
of X basis are totally used to estimate errors. Alice,
Bob and Charlie estimate the gain and quantum bit er-
ror rate with decoy-state method, given that all of them
send out single-photon states. Afterwards, they extract
secure cryptographic conferencing keys after classical er-
ror correction and privacy amplification.
In the asymptotic limit, the MDI-QCC key generation
rate is given by [17, 20, 22]
RQCC =Q
Z
v +Q
Z
111[1−H(eBX111 )]−H(EZ∗µνω)fQZµνω,
(1)
where QZµνω (E
Z∗
µνω), the gain (quantum bit error rate)
of Z basis, can be directly obtained from the experi-
mental results. The subscript µνω means that Alice,
Bob and Charlie send out phase-randomized weak co-
herent pulses with intensity µ, ν and ω, respectively.
Note that each of these pulses has single-photon state
components and the ones of n (> 1) photons or zero
photon. For the post-selected GHZ states contributed
solely by the single-photon state components, the gain
QZ111 of Z basis and the bit error rate e
BX
111 of X ba-
sis can be estimated by the decoy-state method. QZv
is the gain that Alice sends out vacuum state compo-
nent in Z basis and David obtains a GHZ state measure-
ment result. Here, we assume that Alice’s raw key is the
reference raw key, the parameter f is the error correc-
tion efficiency (f = 1.16 in our simulation below), and
H(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary Shan-
non entropy function. The information-theoretic security
proof of MDI-QCC is shown in the Supplemental Mate-
rial, from which we have EZ∗µνω = max{EZABµνω , EZACµνω }.
Here, EZABµνω (E
ZAC
µνω ) is the quantum bit error rate of Z
basis between Alice and Bob (Charlie).
In the same manner, the key generation rate of MDI-
QSS in the asymptotic limit is given by
RQSS =Q
X
v +Q
X
111[1−H(eBZ111)]−H(EXµνω)fQXµνω,
(2)
where QXµνω (E
X
µνω), the gain (quantum bit error rate) of
X basis, can also be directly obtained from the experi-
mental results. For the single-photon state contribution,
the gain QX111 of X basis and bit error rate e
BZ
111 of Z
basis can be estimated by the decoy-state method. QXv
is the gain that Alice sends out vacuum state compo-
nent in X basis and David obtains a GHZ state measure-
ment result. However, the overall quantum bit error rate
EXµνω (always about 37.5% for arbitrarily-long transmis-
sion distances) in X basis is so high that it is virtually
impossible to use weak coherent sources to perform MDI-
QSS with Eq. (2). To solve the problem, in the Supple-
mental Material we propose, in details, to use the trig-
gered spontaneous parametric down conversion sources
[32], or the conventional weak coherent state sources to-
gether with the quantum non-demolition measurement
technique [36].
However, such a solution is disadvantageous as it re-
quires experimentally challenging technology. Fortu-
nately, we can exploit the extra classical bit information
[22, 31] to extract the raw key with little bit error rate
(almost zero) so that we can implement MDI-QSS, again
with weak coherent sources. The classical bit information
corresponds to the information denoted by different over-
all phase regions over [0, 2pi) (the phase post-selection
technique). Meanwhile, we assume the gain and bit error
rate of single-photon states to be in a uniform distribu-
tion over [0, 2pi) [22]. Therefore, the secure key rate of
MDI-QSS with phase post-selection can be given by (see
Supplemental Material [23] for details)
R˜QSS ≥ 1
K2
QX111[1−H(eBZ111)]−H(E˜Xµνω)fQ˜Xµνω,
(3)
where K is the number of phase regions, Q˜Xµνω and E˜
X
µνω
are the gain and bit error rate of the pulses whose in-
formation is used to extract the raw key with little bit
error rate. The phase post-selection technique requires
to share a common phase reference [39] among users. A
method for distributing such a phase reference is sug-
gested in Supplemental Material [23]. We note that
the rigorous security of protocols involving phase post-
selection technique needs more investigations in the con-
texts of both QKD [22, 31] and MDI-QSS.
To analyze the performance of the secret key rates
of MDI-QCC and MDI-QSS, we present an analytical
method with two decoy states to estimate the relevant pa-
rametersQZ111, Q
X
111, e
BZ
111 and e
BX
111 , which are required to
be evaluated in Eqs. (1)-(37). In our simulation, we em-
ploy the following experimental parameters: the intrinsic
loss coefficient β of the standard telecom fiber channel is
0.2 dB/km. For the threshold single-photon detectors,
the detection efficiency ηd = 40%, and the background
count rate pd = 1 × 10−7, as used in a recent decoy-
state MDI-QKD experiment [40]. As a comparison, we
also use the state-of-the-art single-photon detectors [41],
with ηd = 93% and pd = 1 × 10−7. Here, we neglect
the overall misalignment-error probability of the system.
The secure key rates of MDI-QCC with weak coherent
sources in the cases of infinite decoy states and of the
two decoy states are shown in Fig. 2a. From the simu-
4FIG. 2. (color online) Lower bound on the secure key rates
versus fiber channel transmission. a, MDI-QCC with weak
coherent sources. b, MDI-QSS with weak coherent sources
based on phase post-selection technique (K = 8). We show
the simulation results of infinite decoy states and two decoy
states with detector A (B) of detection efficiency 93% (40%),
respectively. The phase-randomized weak coherent sources
with (without) the phase post-selection technique are used
for MDI-QSS (MDI-QCC). The intensity of the signal state
and one decoy state is 0.4 and 0.005 (0.11 and 0.005), while
the other decoy state is a vacuum state in MDI-QCC (MDI-
QSS).
lation result, we see that the estimation using two decoy
states gives a secure key rate which is nearly the same as
the corresponding one using infinite decoy states. In the
case of asymptotic data with two decoy states, the secure
transmission distance between Alice and the middle node
of MDI-QCC is about 190 km for the detection efficiency
of 40% (210 km for the detection efficiency of 93%). The
secure key rates of MDI-QSS with weak coherent sources
based on overall phase post-selection technique are shown
in Fig. 2b. In the case of asymptotic data with two decoy
states, the secure transmission distance is about 130 km
for the detection efficiency of 40% (150 km for the detec-
tion efficiency of 93%) between the middle node and any
user.
The information-theoretic security of our multiparty
quantum communication protocols is guaranteed by the
GHZ entanglement purification technique [22] though
the security of MDI-QSS is complicated by phase post-
selection and needs further study. Indeed, the purpose
of QCC and QSS protocols can be recognized as a proce-
dure for Alice, Bob and Charlie to share almost perfect
FIG. 3. (color online) The Mermin value M111 versus fiber
channel transmission. We use two decoy states to estimate
M111. We show the simulation results for detector A (B) of
detection efficiency of 93% (40%) in red (blue) solid curve,
respectively, the overall misalignment-error probability ed of
the system is 1.5%, with other parameters identical to Fig. 2a.
We also show the line of constant 2, which is the maximal
value allowed by local realism.
GHZ states. Qualitatively, the more perfect the GHZ en-
tanglement shared by Alice, Bob and Charlie is, the more
negligible the information would have been leaked to Eve
[9]. It is thus of vital importance to quantify the quality
of the GHZ entanglement. For this purpose, Alice, Bob
and Charlie independently and randomly prepare quan-
tum states with phase-randomized weak coherent pulses
in two complementary bases (X basis and Y basis) and
then send to David, who performs the GHZ-state (
∣∣Φ+0 〉)
measurement. What we take into consideration here is
the post-selected GHZ states contributed solely by the
single-photon state components. This contribution can
be estimated by the decoy-state method. For the GHZ
entangled state
∣∣Φ+0 〉, local realistic theories must obey
Mermin’s inequality [33]:
M111 ≡〈XXX〉111 − 〈XY Y 〉111
− 〈Y XY 〉111 − 〈Y Y X〉111 ≤ 2.
(4)
Here M111 is defined as the Mermin value and witnesses
the quality of the GHZ entanglement; 〈XXX〉111 and so
on are the expectation values with respect to the GHZ
states solely contributed by the single-photon state com-
ponents. It is important to ensure that one only selects
a single ensemble corresponding to the successful projec-
tion onto the GHZ state
∣∣Φ+0 〉. In our post-selected GHZ
states, the Mermin value, whose maximal value is 4 as
predicted by quantum mechanics for ideal GHZ states,
can reach about 3.5 as shown in Fig. 3 over the distribu-
tion distance of about 170 km from David to Alice (Bob,
Charlie); more details can be found in the Supplemental
Material [23]. This indicates that high-quality GHZ en-
tanglement can be generated at this distance by the pro-
tocol. The proposed protocol can be regarded as a vari-
ance of the usual GHZ experiment testing local realism,
namely, a time-reversed GHZ experiment where the state
5preparations replace the state measurements in the usual
GHZ test. The interpretation of such a variance and,
particularly, its relevance to the test of hidden-variable
theories are interesting in its own right. We argue in the
Supplemental Material [23] that such an experiment tests
Mermin’s argument [35] on the Kochen-Specker theorem
[34].
In summary, we propose a feasible protocol for dis-
tributing the post-selected GHZ entanglement and MDI
multiparty quantum communication over a distance of
more than 100 km for experimentally accessible parame-
ter regimes. Combining the decoy-state and MDI proto-
cols for QKD, we show that the information-theoretically
secure MDI-QCC with the conventional weak coherent
state sources can be implemented over a distance of about
190 km, as well as the MDI-QSS with weak coherent
sources based on phase post-selection technique over a
distance of about 130 km. These distances are signifi-
cantly beyond what one could expect previously for mul-
tiparty quantum communication with the GHZ entangle-
ment. Our proposal thus suggests an important avenue
for practical long-distance multiparty quantum commu-
nication. The extension of our scheme to more legitimate
users is straightforward.
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6SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR “LONG DISTANCE MEASUREMENT-DEVICE-INDEPENDENT
MULTIPARTY QUANTUM COMMUNICATION”
I. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. GHZ State Entanglement Purification
Here, the goal of an entanglement purification protocol is to distill nearly perfect GHZ states from noisy GHZ
states initially shared among three distant parties (typically called Alice, Bob and Charlie). The density matrix ρABC
describing Alice, Bob and Charlie’s qubit system can be expressed in the GHZ basis [1], which is composed of eight
orthogonal GHZ states:
∣∣Φ+0 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|H〉|H〉+ |V 〉|V 〉|V 〉) = 1
2
(|+++〉+ |+−−〉+ |−+−〉+ |− −+〉),
∣∣Φ−0 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|H〉|H〉 − |V 〉|V 〉|V 〉) = 1
2
(|++−〉+ |+−+〉+ |−++〉+ |− − −〉),
∣∣Ψ+1 〉 = 1√
2
(|V 〉|H〉|H〉+ |H〉|V 〉|V 〉) = 1
2
(|+++〉+ |+−−〉 − |−+−〉 − |− −+〉),
∣∣Ψ−1 〉 = 1√
2
(|V 〉|H〉|H〉 − |H〉|V 〉|V 〉) = 1
2
(|++−〉+ |+−+〉 − |−++〉 − |− − −〉),
∣∣Ψ+2 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|V 〉|H〉+ |V 〉|H〉|V 〉) = 1
2
(|+++〉 − |+−−〉+ |−+−〉 − |− −+〉),
∣∣Ψ−2 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|V 〉|H〉 − |V 〉|H〉|V 〉) = 1
2
(|++−〉 − |+−+〉+ |−++〉 − |− − −〉),
∣∣Ψ+3 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|H〉|V 〉+ |V 〉|V 〉|H〉) = 1
2
(|+++〉 − |+−−〉 − |−+−〉+ |− −+〉),
∣∣Ψ−3 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|H〉|V 〉 − |V 〉|V 〉|H〉) = 1
2
(|+−+〉 − |++−〉+ |−++〉 − |− − −〉).
(5)
We take
∣∣Φ+0 〉 as the reference state in this paper. The GHZ state ∣∣Φ+0 〉 is stabilized by its stabilizer generators, i.e.,
S0 = XXX, S1 = ZZI, S2 = ZIZ, (6)
where
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, (7)
denote the phase shift, bit flip and no operation acting on the qubit, respectively. Maneva and Simolin [2] proposed
a multiparty hashing protocol to distill nearly perfect GHZ states by generalizing the quantum XOR operation used
in Ref. [3] to the case of multiparty setting. The yield (per input mixed state) in the case of asymptotic data is given
by [2]
Dh = 1−max{H(eb1), H(eb2)} −H(ep). (8)
Here H(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1 − x) is the standard binary Shannon entropy function, ep is the phase shift
error rate corresponding to the stabilizer generator S0, while eb1 and eb2 represent the bit flip error rates corresponding
to the stabilizer generator S1 and S2, respectively. One can choose two (classical) random hashing codes, one of which
is used to correct bit flip errors and the other one is used to correct phase errors. This can be done by local operation
and classical communication with the help of multilateral quantum XOR operations.
Consider the tripartite density matrix ρABC which describes the qubit system of Alice, Bob and Charlie [1, 4]
ρABC =λ1
∣∣Φ+0 〉〈Φ+0 ∣∣+ λ2∣∣Φ−0 〉〈Φ−0 ∣∣+ λ3∣∣Ψ+1 〉〈Ψ+1 ∣∣+ λ4∣∣Ψ−1 〉〈Ψ−1 ∣∣
+ λ5
∣∣Ψ+2 〉〈Ψ+2 ∣∣+ λ6∣∣Ψ−2 〉〈Ψ−2 ∣∣+ λ7∣∣Ψ+3 〉〈Ψ+3 ∣∣+ λ8∣∣Ψ−3 〉〈Ψ−3 ∣∣, (9)
where
∑8
i=1 λi = 1. e
Z
b1
and eZb2 are defined as the bit flip error rates between Alice and Bob’s bits and between Alice
and Charlie’s bits in Z basis corresponding to the stabilizer generator S1 and S2, respectively, which can be obtained
7from Eq. (5) and Eq. (9) as,
eZb1 = λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6,
eZb2 = λ5 + λ6 + λ7 + λ8.
(10)
We employ the bit error rate eZb to represent the probability that all the bit values of Alice, Bob and Charlie are not
the same,
eZb = λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 + λ7 + λ8. (11)
The phase shift error rate corresponding to the stabilizer generator S0 in Z basis can be given by
eZp = λ2 + λ4 + λ6 + λ8. (12)
Furthermore, if Alice, Bob and Charlie measure the GHZ state in X basis, the random measurement outcomes
will always share a binary correlation XA = XB ⊕ XC . The bit flip error rate in X basis is the probability of
XA ⊕ 1 = XB ⊕ XC , while the phase shift error rate in X basis is the probability that the relative phase changes.
XA ∈ {0, 1} is the binary data corresponding to the polarization {|+〉, |−〉} of Alice. Therefore, from Eq. (5) and
Eq. (9), the bit flip error rate and phase shift error rate in X basis can be given by
eXb = λ2 + λ4 + λ6 + λ8 = e
Z
p ,
eXp = λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 + λ7 + λ8 = e
Z
b .
(13)
B. Post-selected GHZ States
Entanglement purification of GHZ states are closely related to multiparty communication protocols, such as quan-
tum cryptographic conferencing (QCC) [4, 5] and quantum secret sharing (QSS) [6–8]. The relation between them is
that if Alice, Bob and Charlie share almost perfect pure GHZ states, the states will be nearly unentangled with Eve’s
system, which is the term monogamy of entanglement [9]. Therefore, the information leaked to Eve is negligible, and
Alice, Bob and Charlie can obtain an information-theoretically secure key by measuring the GHZ states. Thus, the
purpose of QCC and QSS protocols can be recognized as a procedure for Alice, Bob and Charlie to share almost
perfect GHZ states, which is also the purpose of the entanglement purification protocol. Entanglement purification
protocol can be transformed into the quantum error correction protocol [3], while Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code
can be used to prove the security of quantum communication protocols [10, 11]. With the important property of CSS
code, the error correction procedure for the phase shift error will be decoupled from the error correction procedure
for the bit flip error. The quantum error correction can be transformed into classical post-processing, the bit error
correction (phase error correction) can be regarded as the classical error correction (privacy amplification).
We use a GHZ-state analyzer [12] to post-select GHZ states among three legitimate users (Alice, Bob and Charlie).
The events can be regarded as the time-reversed GHZ state distribution and measurement. Similar to the security
proof of measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum key distribution [10, 13, 14], we suppose that each of Alice,
Bob and Charlie has an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entangled state which contains one virtual qubit in each of them
and the other qubit is sent to the middle node, David. When David performs a successful GHZ-state measurement,
the virtual qubit of the legitimate users becomes a GHZ-entangled state, the procedure of which can be then regarded
as a multiparty entanglement swapping, as experimentally demonstrated [15]. Alice, Bob and Charlie can utilize
quantum memory to store their virtual qubits. After David announces the events through public channels whether
he has obtained a GHZ state and which GHZ state he has received, Alice, Bob and Charlie will measure their
virtual qubits. According to different multiparty quantum communication protocols such as the QCC, QSS and third-
man quantum cryptography, the legitimate users perform the corresponding operations to classical post-processing.
They can extract secure keys after the processes of basis sift, error correction and privacy amplification, which are
all classical procedures. Combined with the decoy sate method [16–18], some practical sources can be used in our
schemes for multiparty quantum communication. For instance, weak coherent sources emitted by laser diodes are used
in MDI-QCC, weak coherent states with extra classical bit information (the phase post-selection technique) are used in
MDI-QSS. Meanwhile, heralded single-photon sources (also called triggered spontaneous parametric down conversion
sources) are used in MDI-QSS. Furthermore, we exploit the quantum non-demolition measurement technique [19] to
effectively realize a long distribution distance MDI-QSS with weak coherent sources.
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When the phases of the weak coherent pulses sent by Alice, Bob and Charlie are fully randomized, the density
matrix of the coherent states can be written as
ρ1 =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
∣∣eiθ√µ〉〈eiθ√µ∣∣ = e−µ ∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
|n〉〈n|, (14)
where θ and µ are the phase and intensity of the coherent states, respectively. Then the quantum channel can
be considered as a photon number channel [17]. Note that the multi-photon components are tagged ones whose
information will be fully leaked to Eve [20], the secure key rate of MDI-QCC can be given by
RQCC = Q
Z
v +Q
Z
111[1−H(ePZ111)]−max
{
H(EZABµνω ), H(E
ZAC
µνω )
}
fQZµνω, (15)
where QZ111 = µνωe
−µ−ν−ωY Z111 is the gain of the single-photon states in Z basis, Q
Z
v = e
−µQZ0νω is the gain that
Alice sends out vacuum state component in Z basis and David obtains a GHZ state measurement result. Here, we
assume that Alice’s raw key is the reference raw key. For single-photon states, the phase error probability ePZ111 in Z
basis is equal to the bit error probability eBX111 in X basis in the case of asymptotic data according to Eq. (13), i.e.,
ePZ111 = e
BX
111 . Q
Z
µνω is the overall gain in Z basis and f is the error correction efficiency. E
ZAB
µνω (E
ZAC
µνω ) is the bit flip
error rate between Alice’s and Bob’s (Charlie’s) bits in Z basis.
In the following, we will focus on the evolution of the joint quantum states before they enter the detectors. Due to
the basis sift in the classical post-processing, we only discuss the case of ZZZ and XXX . The joint quantum states
of Alice, Bob and Charlie sending out horizontal polarization weak coherent states can be given by∣∣eiφa√µ〉
H
∣∣eiφb√ν〉
H
∣∣eiφc√ω〉
H
, (16)
where φa, φb and φc are the overall randomized phases. Then the quantum states arriving at David’s GHZ state
measurement device (before the quantum states enter the detectors) are given by∣∣eiφb√ νηb2 〉1H ∣∣eiφb√ νηb2 〉1V ∣∣eiφc√ωηc2 〉2H ∣∣eiφc√ωηc2 〉2V ∣∣eiφa√µηa2 〉3H ∣∣eiφa√µηa2 〉3V , (17)
where the six detection modes are 1H , 1V , 2H , 2V , 3H and 3V , respectively. ηa, ηb, ηc are the overall detection
efficiencies of Alice, Bob and Charlie, respectively. Therefore, the detection probabilities for the six threshold single-
photon detectors can be written as
D1H = D1V = 1− (1− pd) exp
(
−νηb
2
)
, D2H = D2V = 1− (1− pd) exp
(
−ωηc
2
)
,
D3H = D3V = 1− (1− pd) exp
(
−µηa
2
)
.
(18)
The gain Q
µνωΦ+
0
HHH is defined as the probability that Alice, Bob and Charlie send out horizontal polarization weak
coherent states with the intensity of µ, ν and ω, respectively, with David obtaining a successful GHZ state
∣∣Φ+0 〉
measurement event, which is given by
Q
µνωΦ+
0
HHH =
1
8
[
D1HD2HD3H(1 −D1V )(1 −D2V )(1 −D3V ) +D1HD2VD3V (1−D1V )(1 −D2H)(1−D3H)
+D1VD2HD3V (1−D1H)(1 −D2V )(1 −D3H) +D1VD2VD3H(1−D1H)(1 −D2H)(1−D3V )
]
,
=
1
2
(1 − pd)3e−x2
[
1− (1 − pd)e−
µηa
2
][
1− (1− pd)e−
νηb
2
][
1− (1− pd)e−
ωηc
2
]
,
(19)
where x = µηa + νηb + ωηc, 1/8 stands for the probability of a |HHH〉 polarization when Alice, Bob and Charlie all
choose Z basis, pd is the background count rate. Due to symmetry, we have
Q
µνωΦ+
0
HHH = Q
µνωΦ−
0
HHH = Q
µνωΦ+
0
V V V = Q
µνωΦ−
0
V V V = A. (20)
According to the above procedures, we have
Q
µνωΦ+
0
HHV = Q
µνωΦ+
0
HV V = Q
µνωΦ−
0
HHV = Q
µνωΦ−
0
HV V =
pd
2
(1 − pd)3e−x
(
1− pd − e
νηb
2
)(
1− pd − e 12 (µηa+ωηc)I0 (√µηaωηc)
)
= B,
Q
µνωΦ+
0
VHH = Q
µνωΦ+
0
VHV = Q
µνωΦ−
0
VHH = Q
µνωΦ−
0
VHV =
pd
2
(1 − pd)3e−x
(
1− pd − e
ωηc
2
)(
1− pd − e 12 (µηa+νηb)I0 (√µηaνηb)
)
= C,
Q
µνωΦ+
0
HVH = Q
µνωΦ+
0
V V H = Q
µνωΦ−
0
HVH = Q
µνωΦ−
0
V VH =
pd
2
(1 − pd)3e−x
(
1− pd − e
µηa
2
)(
1− pd − e 12 (νηb+ωηc)I0 (√νηbωηc)
)
= D,
(21)
9where I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind.
In the same manner, when Alice, Bob and Charlie all choose X basis, we have
Q
µνωΦ+
0
+++ = Q
µνωΦ+
0
+−− = Q
µνωΦ+
0
−+− = Q
µνωΦ+
0
−−+ = Q
µνωΦ−
0
++− = Q
µνωΦ−
0
+−+ = Q
µνωΦ−
0
−++ = Q
µνωΦ−
0
−−− = E,
Q
µνωΦ−
0
+++ = Q
µνωΦ−
0
+−− = Q
µνωΦ−
0
−+− = Q
µνωΦ−
0
−−+ = Q
µνωΦ+
0
++− = Q
µνωΦ+
0
+−+ = Q
µνωΦ+
0
−++ = Q
µνωΦ+
0
−−− = F,
(22)
and
Q
µνωΦ+
0
+++ =
1
8
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
[
F1HF2HF3H(1− F1V )(1 − F2V )(1 − F3V ) + F1HF2V F3V (1 − F1V )(1− F2H)(1− F3H)
+ F1V F2HF3V (1− F1H)(1− F2V )(1 − F3H) + F1V F2V F3H(1− F1H)(1− F2H)(1− F3V )
]dφ
2pi
dϕ
2pi
,
Q
µνωΦ−
0
+++ =
1
8
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
[
F1HF2HF3V (1− F1V )(1 − F2V )(1− F3H) + F1HF2V F3H(1− F1V )(1 − F2H)(1 − F3V )
+ F1V F2HF3H(1 − F1H)(1 − F2V )(1− F3V ) + F1V F2V F3V (1− F1H)(1 − F2H)(1 − F3H)
]dφ
2pi
dϕ
2pi
,
(23)
where F1H is the detection probability of detection mode 1H , φ = φa − φb, ϕ = φa − φc, and
F1H = 1− (1− pd)e−(
µηa+νηb
4
+
√
µηaνηb
2
cosφ), F1V = 1− (1 − pd)e−(
µηa+νηb
4
−
√
µηaνηb
2
cosφ),
F2H = 1− (1− pd)e−(
νηb+ωηc
4
+
√
νηbωηc
2
cos (ϕ−φ)), F2V = 1− (1− pd)e−(
νηb+ωηc
4
−
√
νηbωηc
2
cos (ϕ−φ)),
F3H = 1− (1− pd)e−(
µηa+ωηc
4
+
√
µηaωηc
2
cosϕ) F3V = 1− (1 − pd)e−(
µηa+ωηc
4
−
√
µηaωηc
2
cosϕ).
(24)
The overall gain and quantum bit error rates in Z basis can be given by
QZµνω = Q
CZ
µνω +Q
EZ
µνω = Q
CZAB
µνω +Q
EZAB
µνω = Q
CZAC
µνω +Q
EZAC
µνω =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
l=0
µnνmωl
n!m!l!
e−µ−ν−ωY Znml,
EZµνωQ
Z
µνω = edQ
CZ
µνω + (1− ed)QEZµνω =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
l=0
µnνmωl
n!m!l!
e−µ−ν−ωeBZnmlY
Z
nml,
EZABµνω Q
Z
µνω = edQ
CZAB
µνω + (1− ed)QEZABµνω , EZACµνω QZµνω = edQCZACµνω + (1− ed)QEZACµνω ,
(25)
where EZµνω is defined as the probability that all the bit values of Alice, Bob and Charlie are not the same in Z basis.
Y Znml (e
BZ
nml) is the yield (bit error rate) in Z basis, given that Alice, Bob and Charlie send out n-photon, m-photon
and l-photon pulses, respectively. QCZµνω (Q
EZ
µνω) is the total gain of a successful GHZ state measurement when the
polarization of the pulses sent by Alice, Bob and Charlie are the same (different) in Z basis, which represents a
correct (false) measurement result. QCZABµνω (Q
EZAB
µνω ) is the total gain of a successful GHZ state measurement when
the polarization of the pulses sent by Alice and Bob are the same (different) in Z basis, which represents a correct
(false) measurement result. QCZACµνω (Q
EZAC
µνω ) is the total gain of a successful GHZ state measurement when the
polarization of the pulses sent by Alice and Charlie are the same (different) in Z basis, which represents a correct
(false) measurement result. ed represents the overall misalignment-error probability of the system. Therefore, we have
QCZµνω =4A, Q
EZ
µνω = 4(B + C +D), Q
CZAB
µνω = 4A+ 2B + 2D,
QEZABµνω = 2B + 4C + 2D, Q
CZAC
µνω = 4A+ 2C + 2D, Q
EZAC
µνω = 4B + 2C + 2D.
(26)
The overall gain QXµνω and quantum bit error rate E
X
µνω in X basis can be given by
QXµνω = Q
CX
µνω +Q
EX
µνω =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
l=0
µnνmωl
n!m!l!
e−µ−ν−ωY Xnml,
EXµνωQ
X
µνω = edQ
CX
µνω + (1− ed)QEXµνω =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
l=0
µnνmωl
n!m!l!
e−µ−ν−ωeBXnmlY
X
nml,
(27)
where Y Xnml (e
BX
nml) is the yield (bit error rate) in X basis, given that Alice, Bob and Charlie send out n-photon,
m-photon and l-photon pulses, respectively. QCXµνω (Q
EX
µνω) is the total gain of a successful GHZ state measurement
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when the correlation XA = XB ⊕ XC (XA ⊕ 1 = XB ⊕ XC) holds in X basis, which represents a correct (false)
measurement result. Thus, we have QCXµνω = 8E, Q
EX
µνω = 8F . Notice that Alice performs a bit flip when Alice, Bob
and Charlie all choose X basis and David obtains the GHZ state
∣∣Φ−0 〉.
For simplicity, we consider a symmetric scenario that the distances L from Alice, Bob and Charlie to the middle
node David are all the same. So ηa = ηb = ηc = ηd × 10−βL/10 is the overall efficiency including the channel
transmission efficiency 10−βL/10 (β is the intrinsic loss coefficient of the standard telecom fiber channel and L is the
distance between the legitimate users and David) and the efficiency of the detectors ηd. We present an analytical
estimation method with two decoy states (vacuum+decoy state), here µ2 = ν2 = ω2 > µ1 = ν1 = ω1 > 0. With the
derivation method mentioned in [21], we can calculate the lower bound of Y ZL111 , Y
XL
111 and the upper bound of e
BXU
111 ,
eBZU111 , which are given by
Y ZL111 ≥
1
µ32µ
3
1(µ2 − µ1)
[
µ42
(
e3µ1QZµ1µ1µ1 − e2µ1QZµ1µ10 − e2µ1QZµ10µ1 − e2µ1QZ0µ1µ1 + eµ1QZµ100
+ eµ1QZ0µ10 + e
µ1QZ00µ1 −QZ000
)
− µ41
(
e3µ2QZµ2µ2µ2 − e2µ2QZµ2µ20
− e2µ2QZµ20µ2 − e2µ2QZ0µ2µ2 + eµ2QZµ200 + eµ2QZ0µ20 + eµ2QZ00µ2 −QZ000
)]
,
(28)
Y XL111 ≥
1
µ32µ
3
1(µ2 − µ1)
[
µ42
(
e3µ1QXµ1µ1µ1 − e2µ1QXµ1µ10 − e2µ1QXµ10µ1 − e2µ1QX0µ1µ1 + eµ1QXµ100
+ eµ1QX0µ10 + e
µ1QX00µ1 −QX000
)
− µ41
(
e3µ2QXµ2µ2µ2 − e2µ2QXµ2µ20
− e2µ2QXµ20µ2 − e2µ2QX0µ2µ2 + eµ2QXµ200 + eµ2QX0µ20 + eµ2QX00µ2 −QX000
)]
,
(29)
eBXU111 ≤
1
µ31Y
XL
111
(
e3µ1EXµ1µ1µ1Q
X
µ1µ1µ1 − e2µ1EXµ1µ10QXµ1µ10 − e2µ1EXµ10µ1QXµ10µ1 − e2µ1EX0µ1µ1QX0µ1µ1
+ eµ1EXµ100Q
X
µ100 + e
µ1EX0µ10Q
X
0µ10 + e
µ1EX00µ1Q
X
00µ1 − EX000QX000
)
.
(30)
eBZU111 ≤
1
µ31Y
ZL
111
(
e3µ1EZµ1µ1µ1Q
Z
µ1µ1µ1 − e2µ1EZµ1µ10QZµ1µ10 − e2µ1EZµ10µ1QZµ10µ1 − e2µ1EZ0µ1µ1QZ0µ1µ1
+ eµ1EZµ100Q
Z
µ100 + e
µ1EZ0µ10Q
Z
0µ10 + e
µ1EZ00µ1Q
Z
00µ1 − EZ000QZ000
)
.
(31)
III. MDI-QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
A. MDI-QSS with Phase Post-selection Technique
The MDI-QCC (MDI-QSS) protocol uses the data in Z (X) basis to extract secure key. Thus, the secure key rate
of MDI-QSS can be given by
RQSS = Q
X
v +Q
X
111[1−H(ePX111 )]−QXµνωfH(EXµνω). (32)
where QX111 = µνωe
−µ−ν−ωY X111. In the case of asymptotic data, for single-photon states, the phase error probability
in X basis is equal to the bit error probability in Z basis according to Eq. (13), i.e., ePX111 = e
BZ
111 . Q
X
v = e
−µQX0νω is
the gain that Alice sends out vacuum state component in X basis and David obtains a GHZ state measurement result.
QXµνω (E
X
µνω) is the overall gain (bit error rate) in X basis, which can be directly obtained from the experimental
results. Due to that the three parties send out vacuum state, single-photon state and two-photon state in X basis,
respectively, David also obtains a GHZ state measurement result and the probability is the same order with that all
the three parties send out single-photon states, i.e., QX111/2 ∼ QX012 ∼ QX021 ∼ QX102 ∼ QX120 ∼ QX201 ∼ QX210 ≫ QXijk for
i+ j + k > 3. Therefore, the overall bit error rate in X basis can be written as
EXµνω ∼
6e012Q
X
012
QX111 + 6Q
X
012
= 37.5%, (33)
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where e012 = 50% since the vacuum state carries no bit information. However, the overall quantum bit error rate in
X basis is so high that it is virtually impossible to use weak coherent sources to perform MDI-QSS with Eq. (32).
Fortunately, we can exploit the extra classical bit information [22] to extract the raw key with little bit error rate
(almost zero) so that we can implement the MDI-QSS with weak coherent sources. With the decoy state method
[16–18], the overall phase are randomized over [0, 2pi), which can be divided into K parts in the following form
[0, 2pi) =
K−1⋃
k=0
{[kpi
K
,
(k + 1)pi
K
) ∪ [pi + kpi
K
, pi +
(k + 1)pi
K
)}. (34)
Different regions can be denoted by classical bit information, for example, 3-bit classical information represents K = 8
phase regions. At the same time that Alice, Bob and Charlie announce their basis, they also announce their overall
phase regions. Note that different overall phase regions correspond to different bit error rates, they can extract the
raw key with little bit error rate according to phase bit information. Only when their phase regions are chosen the
same, the bit error rates will reach the minimum value. Alice, Bob and Charlie only choose the data in the phase
region [0, piK ) ∪ [pi, pi + piK ) as the effective raw key. Thus, the gain and bit error rate of post-selection raw key can be
written as
Q˜Xµνω = Q˜
CX
µνω + Q˜
EX
µνω, E˜
X
µνωQ˜
X
µνω = (1 − ed)Q˜EXµνω + edQ˜CXµνω, (35)
where
Q˜CXµνω =
K
pi3
∫ pi
K
0
∫ pi
K
0
∫ pi
K
0
[
F1HF2HF3H(1− F1V )(1− F2V )(1 − F3V ) + F1HF2V F3V (1 − F1V )(1− F2H)(1− F3H)
+ F1V F2HF3V (1− F1H)(1− F2V )(1 − F3H) + F1V F2V F3H(1− F1H)(1− F2H)(1− F3V )
]
dφadφbdφc,
Q˜EXµνω =
K
pi3
∫ pi
K
0
∫ pi
K
0
∫ pi
K
0
[
F1HF2HF3V (1− F1V )(1 − F2V )(1− F3H) + F1HF2V F3H(1− F1V )(1 − F2H)(1 − F3V )
+ F1V F2HF3H(1− F1H)(1 − F2V )(1− F3V ) + F1V F2V F3V (1− F1H)(1 − F2H)(1 − F3H)
]
dφadφbdφc.
(36)
We assume the gain and bit error rate of single-photon states to be in a uniform distribution over [0, 2pi) [22]. Therefore,
the secure key rate of MDI-QSS with phase post-selection can be given by
R˜QSS ≥ 1
K2
QX111[1−H(eBZ111)]−H(E˜Xµνω)fQ˜Xµνω, (37)
where 1/K2 represents the probability that all users select the same phase region and we neglect the contribution of
vacuum state component that Alice sends out.
In practical experiments, the phase of the transferred signal will drift due to, e.g., temperature and mechanical
stress variations on the optical fiber or air disturbance of the free-space channel. Fortunately, the drift of phase will
not influence the results of our work, except for MDI-QSS with phase post-selection technique. The common phase
reference is thus required to be shared among all users so that the users can tell which phase region they are. We
remark that solving the problem of sharing common phase reference is to tackle long distance phase-stabilization,
which is usually difficult and required also in quantum fingerprinting [23] and quantum digital signatures [24, 25].
Here, we suggest a possible way to implement phase compensation over a distance to enable the distribution of
the common phase reference among all users. Alice, Bob and Charlie exploit continuous-wave laser sources with the
same central wavelength and narrow line-width to generate continuous-wave laser with almost stabilized phases. The
amplitude modulator generates reference light and signal light. The reference light is used for phase compensation,
while the signal light is used for encoding qubits. When three reference lights with positive 45◦ polarization and same
intensity enter the GHZ-analyzer, the GHZ-analyzer will unambiguously reveal whether the phases among them are
the same or not [26], i.e., detector D1H and D1V compare the phases between Alice and Bob, detector D2H and
D2V compare the phases between Bob and Charlie, detector D3H and D3V compare the phases between Alice and
Charlie, respectively. Thus, with the detection results corresponding to reference light, one can realize the phase
compensation, resulting in a common phase reference among all users. Considering the scattering effects in fiber, the
reference light should not be too strong, so as to reduce the detrimental scattering effects. Another approach could
be to use wavelength division multiplexing with the frequency of reference light less than that of signal light so that
the detrimental scattered photons can be filtered out. As seen from Fig. 1 in the Supplemental Material of Ref [27],
practically the phase drift is about 30pi per second for 100 km standard single-mode fiber (SMF-28), so rapid feedback
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algorithm is necessary for implementing long distance phase compensation. There are some rapid feedback algorithms
realizing phase-stabilization for several kilometers [28–30]. However, successfully accomplishing long distance (100
km) phase-stabilization is still challenging under current technology.
It should be noted that the inclusion of phase post-selection complicates the security analysis, as pointed out in the
context of device-independent QKD [31] or MDI-QKD [22]. The rigorous security of MDI-QSS with weak coherent
states and phase post-selection thus needs more investigations, too.
B. MDI-QSS with Heralded Single-photon Sources
Except for the phase post-selection technique, we propose another two methods to perform MDI-QSS: the triggered
spontaneous parametric down conversion sources, or the conventional weak coherent state sources together with
the quantum non-demolition measurement technique. Instead of taking advantage of weak coherent states which
are divided into two independent states after passing through a beam splitter, we use another universal method to
process the joint quantum state evolution, which can also be used for any photon-number distribution (including
coherent states) of the sources. That is, we use the heralded single-photon sources (also called triggered spontaneous
parametric down-conversion sources) to perform MDI-QSS. Similarly to the above symmetric scenario, η = ηa = ηb =
ηc = ηd × 10−βL/10. The quantum states coming from the heralded single-photon sources can be written as
|Ψ〉 = (coshχ−1)
∞∑
n=0
(tanhχ)n|n, n〉. (38)
We assume that the intensity of the sources is given by µ = sinh2 χ and the heralded single-photon sources always
send out photon pairs. Therefore, the photon number of two modes are always the same. The probability to get an
n-photon pair is
P (n) =
µn
(1 + µ)n+1
. (39)
After triggering out one of the photon pairs, the density matrix of the other mode after phase randomization can then
be given by [32]
ρ2 =
1
Pc
∞∑
n=0
µn
(1 + µ)n+1
[1− (1− pd)(1 − ηd)n]|n〉〈n| =
∞∑
n=0
Pn(µ)|n〉〈n|, (40)
where Pc = (µηd + pd)/(1 + µηd) is the post-selection probability given that one triggered mode leads to the click of
the threshold single-photon detector.
We consider the joint quantum states when Alice and Bob send out i-photon and j-photon states with horizontal
polarization, respectively, while Charlie sends out k-photon state with vertical polarization. The joint quantum states
can be written as
|Ψ〉HHVin = |n〉H |m〉H |l〉V =
(a†1H)
n
√
n!
(a†2H)
m
√
m!
(a†3V )
l
√
l!
|0〉. (41)
The joint quantum states before entering the detectors can be given by
|Ψ〉HHVout =
n+l∑
p=0
m∑
s=0
l∑
t=0
(−1)l−tCp−tn CsmCtl√
2n+m+ln!m!l!
√
p!s!(n+ l − p)!(m− s)!(l − t)!|s〉1H |m− s〉1V |0〉2H |0〉2V |p〉3H |n+ l − p〉3V ,
(42)
where |Ψ〉HHVout denotes the superpositions of orthogonal states |s〉1H |m− s〉1V |0〉2H |0〉2V |p〉3H |n+ l − p〉3V . There-
fore, the gain Q
µνωΦ+
0
HHV and the yield Y
HHV Φ+
0
nml can be written as
Q
µνωΦ+
0
HHV =
1
8
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
l=0
Pµ(n)Pν(m)Pω(l)Y
HHV Φ+
0
nml ,
Y
HHV Φ+
0
nml =
n+l∑
p=0
m∑
s=0
[
G1HG2HG3H(1−G1V )(1 −G2V )(1−G3V ) +G1HG2VG3V (1 −G1V )(1−G2H)(1 −G3H)
+G1VG2HG3V (1−G1H)(1 −G2V )(1−G3H) +G1VG2VG3H(1−G1H)(1 −G2H)(1 −G3V )
]
PHHVnml ,
(43)
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where PHHVnml is the probability of obtaining the quantum state |s〉1H |m− s〉1V |0〉2H |0〉2V |p〉3H |n+ l− p〉3V , G1H is
the detection probability of detector mode 1H , and
PHHVnml =
∣∣∣∣∣
l∑
t=0
(−1)l−tCp−tn CsmCtl√
2n+m+ln!m!l!
√
p!s!(n+ l − p)!(m− s)!
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
G1H = 1− (1− pd)(1− η)s, G1V = 1− (1 − pd)(1 − η)m−s, G2H = pd,
G2V = pd, G3H = 1− (1− pd)(1− η)p, G3V = 1− (1 − pd)(1 − η)n+l−p.
(44)
The above methods can also be extended to cases of other polarizations.
Combining Eqs. (25), (26), (27) with Eq. (40), we will obtain QXµµµ and E
X
µµµ under the heralded single-photon
sources. Similar to Eqs. (28), (29), (30), we can obtain the lower bound of Y XL111 , Y
ZL
111 and the upper bound of e
BZU
111 ,
Y XL111 ≥
1
P 21 (µ2)P
2
1 (µ1)
[
P2(µ2)P1(µ1)− P2(µ1)P1(µ2)
][P 21 (µ2)P2(µ2)(QXµ1µ1µ1 − P0(µ1)QXµ1µ10 − P0(µ1)QXµ10µ1
− P0(µ1)QX0µ1µ1 + P 20 (µ1)QXµ100 + P 20 (µ1)QX0µ10 + P 20 (µ1)QX00µ1 − P 30 (µ1)QX000
)
− P 21 (µ1)P2(µ1)
(
QXµ2µ2µ2
− P0(µ2)QXµ2µ20 − P0(µ2)QXµ20µ2 − P0(µ2)QX0µ2µ2 + P 20 (µ2)QXµ200 + P 20 (µ2)QX0µ20 + P 20 (µ2)QX00µ2 − P 30 (µ2)QX000
)]
,
(45)
Y ZL111 ≥
1
P 21 (µ2)P
2
1 (µ1)
[
P2(µ2)P1(µ1)− P2(µ1)P1(µ2)
][P 21 (µ2)P2(µ2)(QZµ1µ1µ1 − P0(µ1)QZµ1µ10 − P0(µ1)QZµ10µ1
− P0(µ1)QZ0µ1µ1 + P 20 (µ1)QZµ100 + P 20 (µ1)QZ0µ10 + P 20 (µ1)QZ00µ1 − P 30 (µ1)QZ000
)
− P 21 (µ1)P2(µ1)
(
QZµ2µ2µ2
− P0(µ2)QZµ2µ20 − P0(µ2)QZµ20µ2 − P0(µ2)QZ0µ2µ2 + P 20 (µ2)QZµ200 + P 20 (µ2)QZ0µ20 + P 20 (µ2)QZ00µ2 − P 30 (µ2)QZ000
)]
,
(46)
eBZU111 ≤
1
P 31 (µ1)Y
XL
111
(
EZµ1µ1µ1Q
Z
µ1µ1µ1 − P0(µ1)EZµ1µ10QZµ1µ10 − P0(µ1)EZµ10µ1QZµ10µ1
− P0(µ1)EZ0µ1µ1QZ0µ1µ1 + P 20 (µ1)EZµ100QZµ100 + P 20 (µ1)QZ0µ10QZ0µ10 + P 20 (µ1)EZ00µ1QZ00µ1 − P 30 (µ1)EZ000QZ000
)
.
(47)
C. MDI-QSS with Quantum Non-demolition Measurement Technique
In this subsection, we perform MDI-QSS with weak coherent states by employing quantum non-demolition mea-
surement technique. The density matrix of phase randomized weak coherent sources after channel transmission can
be written as
ρ3 = e
−µηt
∞∑
n=0
(µηt)
n
n!
|n〉〈n|, (48)
where the efficiency of channel transmission ηt = 10
−βL/10. David performs quantum non-demolition measurement
on the three incoming pulses from Alice, Bob and Charlie before the pulses enter the GHZ state measurement device.
Only when all the photon numbers of the three incoming pulses are no more than one, David will thereafter make a
GHZ state measurement. Therefore, the gain Q
µνωΦ+
0
HHV and the yield Y
HHV Φ+
0
nml can be written as
Q
µνωΦ+
0
HHV =
1
8
1∑
n=0
1∑
m=0
1∑
l=0
e−µηt−νηt−ωηt
(µηt)
n
n!
(νηt)
m
m!
(ωηt)
l
l!
Y
HHV Φ+
0
nml ,
Y
HHV Φ+
0
nml =
n+l∑
p=0
m∑
s=0
[
K1HK2HK3H(1−K1V )(1−K2V )(1 −K3V ) +K1HK2VK3V (1−K1V )(1−K2H)(1−K3H)
+K1VK2HK3V (1−K1H)(1−K2V )(1−K3H) +K1VK2VK3H(1−K1H)(1 −K2H)(1−K3V )
]
PHHVnml ,
(49)
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where K1H is the detection probability of detection mode 1H , and
PHHVnml =
∣∣∣∣∣
l∑
t=0
(−1)l−tCp−tn CsmCtl√
2n+m+ln!m!l!
√
p!s!(n+ l − p)!(m− s)!
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
K1H = 1− (1− pd)(1− ηd)s, K1V = 1− (1 − pd)(1 − ηd)m−s, K2H = pd,
K2V = pd, K3H = 1− (1− pd)(1 − ηd)p, K3V = 1− (1− pd)(1 − ηd)n+l−p.
(50)
The above methods can also be extended to cases of other polarizations. Similarly to the procedure above, one can
calculate the parameters of Eq. (32). With the above two methods, we can obtain the numerical simulation results of
the secure key rates of MDI-QSS (see Fig. 4).
FIG. 4. (color online) Lower bound on the secure key rates versus fiber channel transmission. a, MDI-QSS with heralded
single-photon sources. b, MDI-QSS with weak coherent sources based on quantum non-demolition measurement technique.
We show the simulation results of infinite decoy states and two decoy states with detector A (B) of detection efficiency 93%
(40%), respectively. The overall misalignment-error probability ed of the system is 1.5%. The phase-randomized heralded single
photon sources are used for MDI-QSS. The intensity of the signal state (one decoy state) is 5 × 10−3 (5 × 10−4), while the
other decoy state is a vacuum state.The phase-randomized weak coherent sources are used for MDI-QSS aided by quantum
non-demolition measurement technique. The intensity of the signal state (one decoy state) is 0.4 (0.005), while the other decoy
state is a vacuum state.
IV. MERMIN’S INEQUALITY
For tripartite systems, each particle is measured by Alice, Bob and Charlie with two bases (settings), local hidden-
variable theories must obey Mermin’s inequality [33]
M = 〈XXX〉 − 〈XY Y 〉 − 〈Y XY 〉 − 〈Y Y X〉 ≤ 2, (51)
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where M is the Mermin value, and
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
. (52)
The Mermin value can reach the maximal value of 4 given that the tripartite GHZ states are measured under the
ideal circumstance, e.g., for
∣∣Φ+0 〉 = 1√
2
(|HHH〉+ |V V V 〉) . (53)
Here, we combine the decoy-state method with weak coherent state sources to estimate the Mermin value of our
post-selected GHZ states,
M
Φ+
0
111 = 〈XXX〉Φ
+
0
111 − 〈XY Y 〉Φ
+
0
111 − 〈Y XY 〉Φ
+
0
111 − 〈Y Y X〉Φ
+
0
111, (54)
where 〈XXX〉Φ
+
0
111 is the expectation value of the GHZ state solely contributed by the single-photon state components,
which results from the successful projection into the GHZ state
∣∣Φ+0 〉, given that Alice, Bob and Charlie send out the
quantum states of X basis. The expectation value of 〈XXX〉Φ
+
0
111 is given by
〈XXX〉Φ
+
0
111 = (1 − 2ed)
Y
111Φ+
0
+++ + Y
111Φ+
0
+−− + Y
111Φ+
0
−+− + Y
111Φ+
0
−−+ − Y 111Φ
+
0
++− − Y 111Φ
+
0
+−+ − Y 111Φ
+
0
−++ − Y 111Φ
+
0
−−−
Y
111Φ+
0
+++ + Y
111Φ+
0
+−− + Y
111Φ+
0
−+− + Y
111Φ+
0
−−+ + Y
111Φ+
0
++− + Y
111Φ+
0
+−+ + Y
111Φ+
0
−++ + Y
111Φ+
0
−−−
. (55)
With weak coherent state sources, the gain Q
µνωΦ+
0
+++ and Q
µνωΦ+
0
−−− can be written as
Q
µνωΦ+
0
+++ =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
l=0
µnνmωl
n!m!l!
e−µ−ν−ωY
nmlΦ+
0
+++ , Q
µνωΦ+
0
−−− =
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
l=0
µnνmωl
n!m!l!
e−µ−ν−ωY
nmlΦ+
0
−−− , (56)
where Y
nmlΦ+
0
+++ (Y
nmlΦ+
0
−−− ) is the yield given that Alice, Bob and Charlie send out n-photon state, m-photon state and
l-photon state with |+〉 (|−〉) polarization, respectively. Thus we can obtain the lower (upper) bound of Y 111Φ
+
0
L
+++
(Y
111Φ+
0
U
+++ and Y
111Φ+
0
U
−−− ) in the following,
Y
111Φ+
0
L
+++ ≥
1
µ32µ
3
1(µ2 − µ1)
[
µ42
(
e3µ1Q
µ1µ1µ1Φ
+
0
+++ − e2µ1Qµ1µ10Φ
+
0
+++ − e2µ1Qµ10µ1Φ
+
0
+++ − e2µ1Q0µ1µ1Φ
+
0
+++ + e
µ1Q
µ100Φ
+
0
+++
+ eµ1Q
0µ10Φ
+
0
+++ + e
µ1Q
00µ1Φ
+
0
+++ −Q000Φ
+
0
+++
)
− µ41
(
e3µ2Q
µ2µ2µ2Φ
+
0
+++ − e2µ2Qµ2µ20Φ
+
0
+++
− e2µ2Qµ20µ2Φ
+
0
+++ − e2µ2Q0µ2µ2Φ
+
0
+++ + e
µ2Q
µ200Φ
+
0
+++ + e
µ2Q
0µ20Φ
+
0
+++ + e
µ2Q
00µ2Φ
+
0
+++ −Q000Φ
+
0
+++
)]
,
(57)
Y
111Φ+
0
U
+++ ≤
1
µ31
(
e3µ1Q
µ1µ1µ1Φ
+
0
+++ − e2µ1Qµ1µ10Φ
+
0
+++ − e2µ1Qµ10µ1Φ
+
0
+++ − e2µ1Q0µ1µ1Φ
+
0
+++ + e
µ1Q
µ100Φ
+
0
+++
+ eµ1Q
0µ10Φ
+
0
+++ + e
µ1Q
00µ1Φ
+
0
+++ −Q000Φ
+
0
+++
)
.
(58)
Y
111Φ+
0
U
−−− ≤
1
µ31
(
e3µ1Q
µ1µ1µ1Φ
+
0
−−− − e2µ1Qµ1µ10Φ
+
0
−−− − e2µ1Qµ10µ1Φ
+
0
−−− − e2µ1Q0µ1µ1Φ
+
0
−−− + e
µ1Q
µ100Φ
+
0
−−−
+ eµ1Q
0µ10Φ
+
0
−−− + e
µ1Q
00µ1Φ
+
0
−−− −Q000Φ
+
0
−−−
)
.
(59)
From Eq. (22) and Eq. (56), we have
Y
111Φ+
0
+++ = Y
111Φ+
0
+−− = Y
111Φ+
0
−+− = Y
111Φ+
0
−−+ ,
Y
111Φ+
0
−−− = Y
111Φ+
0
+−+ = Y
111Φ+
0
−++ = Y
111Φ+
0
++− .
(60)
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The lower bound of 〈XXX〉Φ
+
0
111 can be given by
〈XXX〉Φ
+
0
L
111 = (1 − 2ed)
Y
111Φ+
0
L
+++ − Y 111Φ
+
0
U
−−−
Y
111Φ+
0
U
+++ + Y
111Φ+
0
U
−−−
. (61)
Similar to the above methods, we have the expectation values of 〈XY Y 〉Φ
+
0
111, 〈Y XY 〉Φ
+
0
111 and 〈Y Y X〉Φ
+
0
111 as follows,
〈XXX〉Φ
+
0
111 = −〈XY Y 〉Φ
+
0
111 = −〈Y XY 〉Φ
+
0
111 = −〈Y Y X〉Φ
+
0
111. (62)
Therefore, the lower bound of the Mermin value can be given by
M
Φ+
0
L
111 = 4〈XXX〉Φ
+
0
L
111 = 4(1− 2ed)
Y
111Φ+
0
L
+++ − Y 111Φ
+
0
U
−−−
Y
111Φ+
0
U
+++ + Y
111Φ+
0
U
−−−
. (63)
V. MERMIN’S THREE-PARTICLE VERSION OF THE KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM
The usual GHZ experiment goes by creating a (post-selected) GHZ entangled state and then sending each particle
in the GHZ entanglement over a distance to Alice, Bob and Charlie, each of whom measures the received particle
along a randomly chosen basis (either X basis or Y basis). Each of measured values for each observer should have a
predetermined value and as such, Mermin’s inequality like Eq. (4) in the main text necessarily follows, as required
by local realism, which can be ruled out by performing the actual GHZ experiment.
However, the protocol for demonstrating the violation of Mermin’s inequality is in some sense the time-reversed
GHZ experiment, where the state preparations replace the state measurements in the usual GHZ test and the GHZ-
entangled state is measured at the end of each run of the experiment, rather than prepared at the beginning of each
run. The interpretation of such a time-reversed GHZ experiment and, in particular, its relevance to the test of (local)
realism have never been considered in the literature to the best of our knowledge and are thus interesting in its own
right.
While it is beyond the scope of the main text of the present paper to clarify the point, here we would like to
argue that the proposed time-reversed GHZ experiment enables the test of a particular form of the Kochen-Specker
theorem [34] as proposed by Mermin [35]. The usual Bell theorem (Bell’s inequalities and the GHZ theorem) has three
independent assumptions [36]: locality, realism and freedom of choices (namely, the experimental setting choices are
truly random and free). However, in the proposed time-reversed GHZ experiment, we can suppose that Alice, Bob
and Charlie prepare their own single-photon states randomly either in the X basis or in the Y basis; as a proof-of-
principle argument, we do not use the weak coherent light sources to avoid the experimental complication caused by
the non-ideal light sources. The three single photons are then subject to the GHZ measurement at David’s station.
The measurements and the preparations of these single photons cannot be spacelike-separated. Then we immediately
see that the proposed time-reversed GHZ experiment does not test local realism. Instead, we argue that what it
actually tests is the Kochen-Specker theorem as proposed by Mermin for the case of eight-dimensional space of three
spins/qubits [35].
The Kochen-Specker theorem states that quantum mechanical predictions for any systems of dimensions 3 or
higher cannot be reproduced by noncontextual hidden-variable theories that assume the measurement results to be
predetermined and independent of other compatible measurements. In Mermin’s argument of the Kochen-Specker
theorem, one makes use of a set of the operator identities:
X1X2X3 ·X1 ·X2 ·X3 = 1,
X1Y2Y3 ·X1 · Y2 · Y3 = 1,
Y1X2Y3 · Y1 ·X2 · Y3 = 1,
Y1Y2X3 · Y1 · Y2 ·X3 = 1,
X1X2X3 ·X1Y2Y3 · Y1X2Y3 · Y1Y2X3 = −1,
(64)
where (·) is used to separate operators or operator products. Mermin’s argument of the Kochen-Specker theorem is a
state-independent proof. In the present time-reversed GHZ experiment, we only identify one (
∣∣Φ+0 〉) out of the eight
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GHZ states. Thus, for quantum mechanics to interpret the experiment, we have the following eigenequations
X1X2X3 ·X1 ·X2 ·X3
∣∣Φ+0 〉 = ∣∣Φ+0 〉,
X1Y2Y3 ·X1 · Y2 · Y3
∣∣Φ+0 〉 = ∣∣Φ+0 〉,
Y1X2Y3 · Y1 ·X2 · Y3
∣∣Φ+0 〉 = ∣∣Φ+0 〉,
Y1Y2X3 · Y1 · Y2 ·X3
∣∣Φ+0 〉 = ∣∣Φ+0 〉,
X1X2X3 ·X1Y2Y3 · Y1X2Y3 · Y1Y2X3
∣∣Φ+0 〉 = −∣∣Φ+0 〉.
(65)
How to interpret Eq. (65) by noncontextual hidden-variable theories? According to Mermin [35], each of opera-
tors or operator products (denoted by O) separated by (·) can be assigned a predetermined value v(O). Thus the
noncontextual hidden-variable theories predict the following relations among these predetermined values:
v(X1X2X3)v(X1)v(X2)v(X3) = 1,
v(X1Y2Y3)v(X1)v(Y2)v(Y3) = 1,
v(Y1X2Y3)v(Y1)v(X2)v(Y3) = 1,
v(Y1Y2X3)v(Y1)v(Y2)v(X3) = 1,
v(X1X2X3)v(X1Y2Y3)v(Y1X2Y3)v(Y1Y2X3) = −1.
(66)
Since v(O) = ±1, multiplying both sides of Eq. (66) yields +1 = −1, which is a conflict. The conflict implies that
it is impossible to interpret the experiment by assuming the predetermined values to these operators or operator
productions.
There is a trick that the predetermined values of the four operator productions, v(X1X2X3), v(X1Y2Y3), v(Y1X2Y3)
and v(Y1Y2X3), appear either separately in the first to fourth lines of Eq. (66), or jointly in the last line of Eq. (66).
For the above argument to be valid, either one has to make an additional assumption (e.g., measurements of the
four operator productions do not disturb each other) or one has to be able to measure the four operator productions
with the same apparatus. A similar argument is essential in a GHZ-like refutation of local realism using two-photon
hyperentanglement [37]. Fortunately, in the present case we can avoid the additional assumption also by measuring
the four operator productions by the same apparatus, which is exactly the apparatus for the GHZ-state measurement.
The above reasoning is valid for ideal cases, namely, one has v(O) = ±1 exactly and perfect detections. For practical
experiments, we have Mermin’s inequality (51) by noting that we only identify
∣∣Φ+0 〉 out of the eight GHZ states.
As we noted in Section I.B, in the security proof of our multiparty quantum communication protocols, we suppose
that each of Alice, Bob and Charlie has an EPR entangled state which contains one virtual qubit in each of them and
the “signal” qubit is sent to the middle node, David. After a successful GHZ-state measurement performed by David,
the virtual qubit of the legitimate users becomes a GHZ-entangled state. This procedure is known as a multiparty
entanglement swapping. If we suppose that each of Alice, Bob and Charlie possesses two EPR-entangled photons,
rather than the virtual+signal qubits, a successful GHZ-state measurement by David would result in three-photon
GHZ entanglement. The GHZ entanglement created this way can be used to demonstrate the violation of local realism
as usual provided that the measurements performed by Alice, Bob, Charlie and David are spacelike separated. Such
an experiment can even be performed in a delayed-choice version, as demonstrated for the case of two qubits both
theoretically [38] and experimentally [39].
∗ zbchen@ustc.edu.cn
[1] W. Du¨r, J. I. Cirac, and R. Tarrach, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3562 (1999).
[2] E. N. Maneva and J. A. Smolin, Contemp. Math. 305, 203 (2002).
[3] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin, and W. K. Wootters, Phys. Rev. A 54, 3824 (1996).
[4] K. Chen and H.-K. Lo, Quantum Inf. Comput. 7, 689 (2007).
[5] S. Bose, V. Vedral, and P. L. Knight, Phys. Rev. A 57, 822 (1998).
[6] M. Hillery, V. Buzˇek, and A. Berthiaume, Phys. Rev. A 59, 1829 (1999).
[7] Y.-A. Chen, A.-N. Zhang, Z. Zhao, X.-Q. Zhou, C.-Y. Lu, C.-Z. Peng, T. Yang, and J.-W. Pan, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
200502 (2005).
[8] S. Gaertner, C. Kurtsiefer, M. Bourennane, and H. Weinfurter, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 020503 (2007).
[9] B. M. Terhal, IBM J. Research and Development 48, 71 (2004).
[10] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
18
[11] H.-K. Lo, Quantum Inf. Comput. 1, 81 (2001).
[12] J.-W. Pan and A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. A 57, 2208 (1998).
[13] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503 (2012).
[14] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999).
[15] C.-Y. Lu, T. Yang, and J.-W. Pan, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 020501 (2009).
[16] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[17] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230504 (2005).
[18] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[19] P. Grangier, J. Levenson, and J. Poizat, Nature 396, 537 (1998).
[20] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and J. Preskill, Quantum Inf. Comput. 4, 325 (2004).
[21] F. Xu, M. Curty, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, New J. Phys. 15, 113007 (2013).
[22] X. Ma and M. Razavi, Phys. Rev. A 86, 062319 (2012).
[23] J. M. Arrazola and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 89, 062305 (2014).
[24] J. M. Arrazola and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 90, 042335 (2014).
[25] V. Dunjko, P. Wallden, and E. Andersson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 040502 (2014).
[26] E. Andersson, M. Curty, and I. Jex, Phys. Rev. A 74, 022304 (2006).
[27] Y. Liu, T.-Y. Chen, L.-J. Wang, H. Liang, G.-L. Shentu, J. Wang, K. Cui, H.-L. Yin, N.-L. Liu, L. Li, et al., Phys. Rev.
Lett. 111, 130502 (2013).
[28] S.-B. Cho and T.-G. Noh, Opt. Express 17, 19027 (2009).
[29] Y. Liu, L. Ju, X.-L. Liang, S.-B. Tang, G.-L. S. Tu, L. Zhou, C.-Z. Peng, K. Chen, T.-Y. Chen, Z.-B. Chen, et al., Phys.
Rev. Lett. 109, 030501 (2012).
[30] A. Cuevas, G. Carvacho, G. Saavedra, J. Carin˜e, W. Nogueira, M. Figueroa, A. Cabello, P. Mataloni, G. Lima, and
G. Xavier, Nature Commun. 4, 2871 (2013).
[31] X. Ma and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Quantum Inf. Comput. 12, 0203 (2012).
[32] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 (2000).
[33] N. D. Mermin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 65, 1838 (1990).
[34] S. Kochen and E. P. Specker, J. Math. Mech. 17, 59 (1967).
[35] N. D. Mermin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 65, 3373 (1990).
[36] T. Scheidl, R. Ursin, J. Kofler, S. Ramelow, X.-S. Ma, T. Herbst, L. Ratschbacher, A. Fedrizzi, N. K. Langford, T. Jen-
newein, et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 107, 19708 (2010).
[37] Z.-B. Chen, J.-W. Pan, Y.-D. Zhang, Cˇ. Brukner, and A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 160408 (2003).
[38] A. Peres, J. Mod. Opt. 47, 139 (2000).
[39] X.-S. Ma, S. Zotter, J. Kofler, R. Ursin, T. Jennewein, Cˇ. Brukner, and A. Zeilinger, Nature Phys. 8, 479 (2012).
